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1 Introduction
The impact of democracy on foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries is a hotly debated
issue. Jensen (2003, 2008) and Azémar and Desbordes (2009) provide an overview of the literature
on FDI and democracy.
On the one hand, it has been argued that democratic forms of government attract FDI because
they tend to be predictable and credible, thanks to vertical and horizontal accounting mechanisms.
The combination of periodic elections and widespread diffusion of information ensures that politi-
cians make clear their preferences, do not renege on their promises once in power, and, more broadly,
do not abuse their position for private gains. Strong checks and balances increase policy stability,
and ultimately the protection of property rights, because the existence of several distinct veto players
hinders any changes in the status quo. When policy changes do occur, institutionalised channels of
influence/lobbying can allow foreign investors to mitigate any adverse effects. Consolidated democ-
racies also guarantee orderly and non-violent changes of government within the current institutional
framework.
On the other hand, the virtues of democracy can easily be seen as disadvantages to countries
wanting to attract multinational enterprises (MNEs). Politicians’ desire to win the elections may
lead them to promise and adopt popular but economically harmful policies. Political turnover creates
uncertainty about the persistence of policies, whereas an increase in the number of veto players has
the potential to result in long-term reform sclerosis. Foreign firms may suffer from a political liability
of foreignness and be discriminated against relative to their better politically-connected domestic
competitors. Finally, a related but more sinister view is that freedom of expression and open media
can prevent foreign firms from colluding with officials in order to obtain generous entry deals or to
decrease market competition. Hence, FDI may be attracted by autocracies.
This ambiguous theoretical impact of democracy on FDI is mirrored in the empirical literature.
As described in Table 1, studies find positive (Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Busse, 2004;
Azémar and Desbordes, 2009), negative (Li and Resnick, 2003), or insignificant (Blanton and Blanton,
2007; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Choi and Samy, 2008) impacts, depending on the econometric model,
the proxy for democracy, and the sample used.
The presence of outliers, i.e. observations which are substantially different from the bulk of the
data, has sometimes been blamed for this variety of findings. Some researchers have attempted to
deal with these atypical observations (Jakobsen and De Soysa, 2006; Choi, 2009; Li, 2009). How-
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ever, it is unlikely that they have solved this issue in a satisfactory manner. Popular robust estimators
(e.g. median regression estimator or M-estimator) are sensitive to outliers present in the values of ex-
planatory variables and outlier diagnostics (e.g. the Cook Distance) frequently fail to detect atypical
observations as they fundamentally rely on the extremely non-robust-to-outliers least-squares estima-
tor (Verardi and Croux, 2009). Problems of inadequate econometric identification and treatment of
outliers thus remain pervasive in the FDI literature.
A related issue is the increasing use of the fixed effects estimator in order to control for unobserved
time-invariant unit-specific effects which may be correlated with the explanatory variables. While this
estimator may reduce any omitted variable bias, it does not protect against outlier contamination. An
aggravating problem is that the most resistant robust regression methods are ill-designed to analyse
econometric models which include a large number of dummies. While some robust panel data estima-
tors have been proposed, they appear not to be consistent when the number of time periods is small,
and cannot deal with dummies not related to the within transformation (Aquaro and Pavel, 2010).
In this paper, we revisit the link between FDI and democracy in developing countries, during the
1998-2006 period. We pay particular attention to the multi-faceted nature of democracy, the influence
of outliers, and the heterogeneous relationship that may exist between these two variables. We use a
variety of measures to explore how each particular dimension of democracy can influence FDI. We
develop a new robust dummy estimator, which allows us to control for outliers in a fixed effects panel
data model. Finally, we investigate whether the impact of democracy on FDI depends on natural
resources, income inequality, and their interaction. Our results show that democracy has generally a
positive impact on FDI, once outliers are controlled for, but that this relationship is very specific to
each host country’s characteristics.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our new robust dummy estimator
and explains its advantages over existing robust regression methods. Section 3 provides Monte-Carlo
simulations highlighting the good performance of our estimator. Section 4 replicates a key study on
FDI and democracy in order to highlight that the correct treatment of outliers is a key issue. Section
5 describe the data used in our original empirical analysis and motivate our econometric approach.
Section 6 presents and interprets our empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 The robust dummy estimator
The objective of linear regression analysis is to examine how a dependent variable is linearly related to
a set of explanatory variables. Technically speaking, it consists in estimating the vector θ of unknown
parameters in:
y = Xθ + ε (1)
where y is the dependent variable and X is the (n × p) matrix of regressors. Matrix X = (X1, X2)
is composed of two blocks: X1 that is the (n × p1) matrix of dummy variables and X2 that is the
(n× p2) matrix of the continuous variables (p = p1 + p2).
On the basis of the estimated parameters θˆ, it is possible to predict the dependent variable yˆ and
to fit the residual ri = yi − yˆi. Although θ can be estimated in several ways, the underlying idea
is always to try to get as close as possible to the true model by minimising an aggregate measure of
dispersion of the residuals. In the case of the well-known ordinary least squares (LS) estimator, the
measure of spread used is the variance. The vector of parameters estimated by LS is therefore:
θˆLS = argmin
θ
n∑
i=1
r2i (θ) (2)
A well-known feature of the variance (and consequently of LS) is that it is extremely sensitive to the
presence of outliers. To take this into account, Rousseuw and Yohai (1984) propose another estimator,
a S-estimator, that is based on the minimisation of another measure of dispersion s of the residuals,
an M-estimator of scale.
An M-estimator of scale is a very general class of estimators of dispersion that do include the
variance. Indeed, the M-estimator of scale is defined as a value of s satisfying equality
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρ(
ri(θ)
s
) = δ (3)
where δ = E[ρ(Z)] with Z ∼ N(0, 1). If we choose as ρ function the square function, δ = 1 and
this equality becomes 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
ri(θ)
s
)2
= 1 which can be re-written as 1
n
n∑
i=1
ri (θ)
2 = s2 which is the
definition of the variance (since r¯ (θ) = 0).
As previously stated, an S-estimator of regression minimises an M-estimator of scale of the residu-
als. Since LS minimises the variance of the residuals, the LS estimator is a special type of S-estimator.
4
A common choice for the ρ function in (3) is the Tukey’s biweight function as defined in (4):
ρ(u) =


k2
6
(
1−
[
1−
(
u
k
)2]3)
if |u| ≤ k
k2
6
if |u| > k
. (4)
where u corresponds to standardised residuals. The loss function of LS can still be obtained by
considering a tuning parameter k going to infinity, as limk→∞ k
2
6
(
1−
[
1−
(
u
k
)2]3)
= 1
2
u2.
To increase robustness, the loss function should award less importance to atypical observations,
i.e. observations associated with very large residuals. This is obtained by reducing the value of tuning
parameter k. Figure 1 shows Tukey’s biweights function for different values of the tuning constant.
In the LS case (k = ∞), the importance of the standardised residuals u increases with u. In the other
cases, the importance awarded to residuals is bounded. If one sets the tuning parameter very low,
the resistance to outliers is very high but this will come at a cost since the gaussian efficiency of the
estimator will be low. There is therefore a trade-off between robustness and efficiency. A common
value for the tuning constant k is 1.546, which results in an estimator which has a breakdown point of
50% (i.e. an estimator that withstands a contamination of up to 50% of outliers before producing an
arbitrary result).
0
2
4
6
ρ(u
)
−5 0 5
Scaled residual (u)
k=2 k=3 k=4 k=∞
Figure 1: Tukey’s biweights function for different values of the tuning constant (k)
Explicit formulas for θˆ are generally not available and it is necessary to call on numerical opti-
misation based on subsampling and iteratively reweighted algorithms to find a solution to (3). Un-
5
fortunately, it can be shown that these algorithms turn out to be inapplicable when several dummy
variables are present, as can be the case in a fixed effects panel data setting. Indeed, as emphasised
by Maronna and Yohai (2000), sub-sampling algorithms can easily lead to collinearity within sub-
samples if various dummies are among the regressors.
To cope with this issue, several procedures have been proposed. Rousseeuw and Wagner (1994)
propose a procedure that guarantees that individuals in all the categories identified by the dummies
are present in the subsets, circumventing thus the issue of perfect multicollinearity. This algorithm
however leads to a great number of replications and therefore becomes excessively slow (and unap-
plicable) when datasets are large. Hubert and Rousseeuw (1997) suggest using a multivariate outlier
detection tool to identify leverage points (i.e. outliers in the x-dimension) which they then apply a
weight zero to, and subsequently, to use an estimator that withstands contamination on the vertical
dimension (such as median regression) but that does not need to be robust against leverage points
(since these have already been removed). However they focus exclusively on continuous right hand
side variables.
Finally, Maronna and Yohai (2000) propose two estimators. First, The M-GM estimator, which
is similar to that of Hubert and Rousseeuw (1997), but where the influence of dummies in the multi-
variate setup is tackled by partialling them out. This estimator has a low breakdown point. Second,
the M-S estimator, which alternates two estimators: an M-estimator and an S-estimator. Regression
monotonic M-estimators are easy to compute and minimise the sum of a a less rapidly increasing
function of the residuals than the quadratic loss function. The drawback of these estimators is that
they can only be used when outliers belong to the dependent variable and there is no outlyingness
in the space of the explanatory variables (i.e. when no leverage points are present). This is the case
when a continuous variable is regressed on a set of dummy variables. On the other hand, S-estimators
cope well with leverage points but their practical implementation is often unfeasible when several
dummies are present due to the existence of collinear sub-samples. The MS algorithm alternates
therefore between an M-estimator after partialling-out continuous variables and an S-estimator after
partialling-out dummy explanatory variables. The partialling-out is done using the estimated param-
eters obtained in the previous M or S step. A disadvantage of this method is that the algorithm has to
be stopped after a set number of iterations, even though there is no guarantee that no better solution
would have appeared in further replications. Indeed, as stated by Maronna and Yohai (2000), the scale
(the measure of dispersion of the residuals) does not necessarily decrease after each iteration.
6
To avoid these drawbacks, we advocate working with an S-estimator that has good properties
and that can theoretically handle dummies. However, we propose to modify the optimisation code
in a manner that avoids perfectly collinear sub-samples. The algorithm is described in details in the
Appendix. Once the parameters are estimated, it is straightforward to identify outliers. This is done
by calculating standardised residuals (i.e. robust residuals divided by their dispersion) and identifying
those larger than a given cut-off point. The cut-off point that we use is 2.25.1 Having identified the
outliers, we can award them a weight zero and run a standard LS regression.
In the next section, we present some Monte-Carlo simulations to show the good behaviour of the
S-estimator programmed in this way.
3 Monte-Carlo simulations
We run three different simulations:
a. For a first set of simulations, three design variables, X1, X2, X3 and an error term u are gen-
erated from four N(0, 1) series. The dependent variable y is generated according to the data
Generating Process (DGP): yit = X1it +X2it +X3it + uit.
b. For a second set of simulations, 20 dummy variables, generated from independent Bernouilli
distributions (p = 0.5), are added to the design space. The DGP becomes yit = X1it +X2it +
X3it +
20∑
j=1
dj + uit.
c. For a final set of simulations, a Panel Fixed Effects (FE) setup is created. Variables X2, X3
and the error term u are generated from three independent N(0, 1) series. Variable X1 and the
individual constants are not independent and are generated in the following way:
(i) variables X1 and d come from a bivariate normal distribution N (µ,Σ) where µ = (0, 0)
and Σ =

 1 0.8
0.8 1

 .
(ii) the d variable is modified according to transformation d = round(d ∗ 5) and the DGP
becomes yit = X1it +X2it +X3it + di + uit, with Corr(X1it, di) ̸= 0. The unit-specific
effects will be estimated using dummy variables.
1If the residuals were normally distributed, values above or below these cut-off points would be strongly atypical
since they would be 2.25 standard deviations away from the mean (which is zero by construction), with a probability of
occurrence of 0.025.
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To create outliers, 10 observations for the X1 variable are modified and randomly picked from a
N(0, 10) series. For all simulations the sample size is 200 and the number of simulations is 1000.
In all simulations, y is regressed on the Xs and the dummies using respectively a robust dummy
estimator (the S-estimator programmed using the code we propose) and a classical LS estimator. We
report
• in Figure 2, the histogram of the coefficients associated to variablesX1, X2 andX3, in all three
scenarios. We call the estimated coefficients B1, B2 and B3.
• in Tables 2 and 3, the bias and the mean squared error (MSE) of the parameters estimated using
the robust dummy estimator and the classical LS estimator.
As can be seen from the simulations, the robust dummy estimator behaves well when dummies
are present. All estimated coefficients are normally distributed (Figure 2) and the bias and MSE are
minimal (Tables 2 and 3). On the other hand, and as expected, the least squares estimator behaves
poorly in every scenario.
Table 2: Bias and MSE of the robust dummy estimator
Note: MSE: Mean Squared Error. Values for parameters B1, B2, B3: 1, 1, 1.
Setup1 Setup 2 Setup 3
Bias MSE Bias MSE Bias MSE
B1 -0.004 0.007 -0.007 0.016 -0.004 0.044
B2 -0.003 0.006 -0.01 0.015 -0.004 0.016
B3 -0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.0131 -0.015 0.014
Table 3: Bias and MSE of the LS estimator
Note: MSE: Mean Squared Error. Values for parameters B1, B2, B3: 1, 1, 1.
Setup1 Setup 2 Setup 3
B1 -0.829 0.688 -0.806 0.651 -1.001 1.003
B2 -0.013 0.006 -0.042 0.007 0.003 0.008
B3 -0.119 0.020 0.091 0.014 0.008 0.010
Having shown the good behaviour of our robust-to-outliers dummy estimator, we now investigate
the robustness of the findings of a key study on the relationship between FDI and democracy.
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Figure 2: Behaviour of the robust dummy estimator
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4 Replication
According to Google Scholar, Jensen (2003) is the most cited empirical study on the relationship
between FDI and democracy. It has been cited 650 times, and, as shown in Figure 3, it remains a key
reference nowadays. In this section, we investigate the robustness of this study’s findings to outliers.2
The sample covers 112 countries over the period 1970-1997, the dependent variable is FDI inflows
as a share of GDP, and the proxy for democracy is Polity IV score (see Table 5 for a description).
We focus on the key regression of the paper: model 10 in Table 4. The estimates suggest that a fully
autocratic government (score of 0) becoming fully democratic (score of 20) can be expected to attract
0.4% more FDI flows as a percentage of GDP. Given that the average level of FDI flows in the sample
is 1.3% of GDP, this is a sizeable amount.
Table 4 presents our results. Column (1) replicates perfectly the estimates found in Jensen (2003).
In column (2), we remove the observations identified as outliers by the Cook distance, which is a
scaled measure of the distance between the coefficient vectors when a given observation is omitted.
2Data are downloaded from Nathan Jensen’s website (http://www.natemjensen.com/
replication-data/).
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Figure 3: Citations of Jensen (2003)
Source: Google Scholar.
Five percent of the observations are deemed to be outliers. Their omission has no qualitative impact
on the results. In column (3) we use an M-estimator, which gives a lower weight to observations with
large standardised residuals but is no robust to leverage points. The estimated impact of democracy
falls by half. In column (4), the M-estimator is used again, but the sample now only includes obser-
vations which have not been identified as outliers, and therefore potential leverage points, in column
(2). This is essentially what the Stata command -rreg- is doing. Results are similar to those in column
(4).
In column (5), we now use our robust-to-outliers dummy estimator. The coefficient on democracy
remains positive and statistically significant. However, the estimated effect of democracy on FDI
is only 25% the magnitude of the initial estimate. A fully autocratic government becoming fully
democratic can now be expected to attract only 0.1% more FDI flows as a percentage of GDP. It is
worth noting than the fit of this regression is much better than that of column (1): the R-squared
increases from 0.613 to 0.945. This reflects the fact that a sizeable number of observations (25%)
are not well explained by the empirical model. In column (6), the model is estimated using the
outlying observations. It can be seen that the vast majority of countries had experienced atypical FDI
flows. These episodes are not well predicted by past FDI flows and tend to coincide with changes in
economic growth and fiscal stance. In column (7), we use the MS estimator. Results are very close to
those in column (5).3
Figure 4 provides a way of assessing the most outlying countries. Countries are classified as
outliers when the value of the mean of the residuals standardised by a robust estimate of their standard
deviation is greater than 2.25 (dashed lines). The most outlying countries tend to be small countries,
located in Eastern Europe, Latin America, or Sub-Saharan Africa. It is often not straightforward to
3In the final estimation stage, the M-S estimator uses all (weighted) observations whereas our robust dummy estimator
omits identified outliers. This explains why the reported number of observations is different in column (5) and (7).
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explain why some observations are outliers. However, in the case of Eastern Europe countries, it is
easy to interpret their atypical behaviour as the consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and their
subsequent adoption of market-based economic systems with mixed results. Figure 5 shows that the
Eastern Europe countries in the sample experienced a boom in FDI and rapid democratisation after
the year 1989, despite deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. These two concomitant trends may
explain the positive relationship between FDI and democracy identified in column (1).
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Figure 5: Key indicators for Transition countries
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We investigate this possibility in column (8) where we remove Eastern European countries from
the sample (4% of the observations). We now fail to find a statistically significant impact of democ-
racy on FDI. It could be argued that these observations provide valuable information since they could
be interpreted as encompassing a ‘natural experiment’ on the effects of democracy on FDI. Hence,
in column (9), we use the full sample but we include interaction terms between the nineties dummy
variable and three regional dummy variables (EAS: Eastern Europe; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; LAC:
Latin America and the Carribean). In that way, we control for common effects in each region which
may influence FDI and may also be correlated with democracy. The coefficients on the interaction
terms indicate that the EAS and LAC regions have indeed attracted, holding other factors constant,
much more FDI than other regions in the nineties. Once we control for these regional effects, the coef-
ficient on democracy becomes negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting that democratisation
occurred at the same time as the improvement of the business environment for foreign investors, but
had not a direct effect on a country’s attractiveness. Finally, in column (10), we estimate the model
of column (9) using our robust-to-outliers dummy estimator. Relative to column (5), the number
of outliers identified is roughly the same but we now fail to find a statistically significant impact of
democracy on FDI.
To sum up, we initially found that the estimated impact of democracy on FDI put forward by
Jensen (2003) is reduced by three-quarters when we control for outliers. The outlying observations
were not identified by common robust methods and diagnostic tools. Analysis of the outliers sug-
gested the adoption of a more flexible model, which took into account that some regions have ex-
perienced dramatic changes in their political and economic conditions. When we did so, controlling
for outliers or not, we failed to find a statistically significant positive impact of democracy on FDI.
Hence, the findings of Jensen (2003) seems to stem from model misspecification (a restrictive em-
pirical model) that we were able to identify and mitigate thanks to our robust-to-outliers dummy
estimator.
We now turn to our contribution to the empirical literature.
5 The effects of democracy on FDI: empirical model and data
Democracy is an elusive concept. Schumpeter (1942) adopted a minimalist perspective by defining it
as “the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the
13
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (p.250). His vision revolves
around the existence of contested elections, which can be interpreted as a disciplining device, but does
not involve any reference to the institutional arrangements constraining the abuse of political powers
between elections. These constitutional checks and balances are nevertheless often judged to be a
vital democratic attribute (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Media freedom is also perceived as a crucial
component of a well-functioning democracy as it guarantees that formal and real accountability over-
lap. The various proxies that we use in this paper cover these various aspects of democracy. Table 5
provides detailed information on each measure. To facilitate comparison of estimates, we normalise
all variables: each proxy of democracy is rescaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one.
We will test each of these democracies proxies, using the following fixed effects dynamic panel
data model:
ln(FDI)it = γ1ln(FDI)it−1 + β1Democracyit + β2Regulatory Qualityit +
β3ln(GDP)it + β4ln(POP)it + Ci + Tt + ϵit
where Ci are time-invariant country-specific effects, Tt are country-invariant time effects and ϵit is
the error term. Our measure of FDI is the log of financial FDI stock (liabilities), which have been
carefully compiled for a large sample of countries over the period 1970-2006 by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). Note that unlike the studies reported in Table 1, we use FDI stocks instead of FDI
flows. As explained by Egger and Merlo (2007), theoretical models of FDI suggest that this is the
appropriate dependent variable; change in the value of a given determinant leads to FDI flows until a
new steady-state FDI stock is reached.
We wish to keep the sample constant across all regressors. Data for the WGI Voice and Ac-
countability indicator start in 1996, and are only available in even years from 1998 to 2002. We
decided therefore to work with the same two-year interval dataset, whichever the measure of democ-
racy tested. Overall, our sample covers 111 developing countries and five years: 1998, 2000, 2002,
2004, and 2006. For each country, we have therefore a maximum of five observations.
This short time dimension of our panel, the presence of a lagged dependent variable, and the
inclusion of fixed effects, motivate us to keep our empirical model parsimonious. In addition to
democracy, we control for four other variables. The lagged dependent variable captures the sluggish
14
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adjustment of FDI stocks towards their long-run levels over time (Kinoshita and Mody, 2001). Market
size (GDP) is the most accepted determinant of FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). The combination of GDP
and population size allows to control for the level of development, which can be seen as a catchall
proxy for various factors attracting or deterring FDI, e.g. consumers’ purchasing power or labour
costs (Benassy-Quere, Coupet and Mayer, 2007; Cheung and Qian, 2009; Lane, 2015). Finally, we
include the World Bank governance measure of regulatory quality. This governance dimension has
frequently been found to be one of the most statistically significant institutional determinant of FDI
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Daude and Stein, 2007) and is well-correlated with the different
measures of democracy (r ≃ 0.60). We do not include other governance variables because we do
not want to eliminate the channels of influence through which democratic changes can influence FDI,
e.g. a strengthening of property rights protection. Lastly, we assume that other FDI determinants are
captured adequately by the fixed effects, including time-invariant country characteristics which may
be correlated with democracy.
It could be argued that the time series dimension of our panel is too short to identify the impact of
democracy on FDI through the investigation of how changes in FDI are related to changes in democ-
racy. However Table 6 shows that the within variation of the measures of democracy is relatively
high, with values ranging between one-third and one-half of the between variation. This relatively
high time-series variation indicates that many countries have experienced changes in their political
regimes over the period 1998-2006. In more econometric terms, although we do not exploit the be-
tween variation of the data, the within variation of the data is high enough to allow the relatively
precise identification of the parameters of our empirical model.
Table 6: Between and within components of the standard deviations of democratic proxies
Notes: FH: Freedom House; DPI: Database of Political Institutions; WGI: Worldwide Governance Indica-
tor. Between variation: standard deviation of xi. Within variation: standard deviation of (xit − xi).)
Measure Between Within Ratio B/W
Polity IV score 0.95 0.26 0.27
FH political rights 0.95 0.29 0.31
Polity IV constraints on executive 0.95 0.30 0.32
Henisz strength of veto players 0.90 0.43 0.48
DPI strength of veto players 0.92 0.40 0.43
FH press freedom 0.93 0.33 0.35
WGI voice and accountability 0.96 0.24 0.25
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It is well known that the fixed effects estimator for dynamic panel models is biased and inconsis-
tent for fixed T time periods, due to the correlation of the within transformed lagged dependent vari-
able with the within transformed error term (Nickell, 1981). Using instrumental variables methods to
obtain consistent estimates would singularly complicate the implementation of our robust-to-outliers
dummy estimator and distract us from our main focus. We circumvent this issue by constraining
γ1 = 0.75, which is the value that we obtain when we estimate this coefficient over the 1980-2006
period for our sample of countries, using a robust application (see Desbordes and Verardi (2011)) of
the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) dynamic panel data estimator.4
6 Empirical results
6.1 Baseline results
Our initial empirical results are presented in Table 7. For each measure of democracy, we provide the
classical FE estimates, the robust dummy (R-FE) estimates, and, for comparison, Maronna and Yohai
(2000) M-S estimates.
Supporters of democracy would find the FE estimates extremely disappointing as no democratic
attribute appears to exert a substantial and statistically significant effect on FDI. Furthermore, it is
disconcerting to find that GDP, the most robust FDI determinant in the literature, is not statistically
significant. On the other hand, the R-FE estimates paint a much different and nuanced picture. For
most proxies, democracy appears to have a positive and statistically significant impact on FDI. A one
standard deviation increase in democracy would increase FDI by about 3-10% in the short run. These
effects are not negligible since they are equivalent to a 20-40% rise in GDP (holding population
constant), which is now also a statistically significant determinant of FDI, along with population.
Foreign investors seem to be particularly attracted by countries in which political decisions become
more constrained by institutional checks and balances and greater media freedom. Column (8’) of
Table 7 shows that a free press trumps other democratic attributes defining a ‘liberal democracy’,
including checks and balances.
Media freedom does not necessarily coincide with free and fair elections (r ≈ 0.82) or the level of
4Due to data availability, the estimated empirical model did not include the World Bank governance measure of reg-
ulatory quality. Results are similar when we use different values within the 95% confidence interval [0.77,0.84] of the
coefficient.
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political constraints faced by policymakers (r ≈ 0.49). In other words, autocracies and (partially) free
media seem compatible. Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009) suggest that this co-existence results from
the need for an autocrat to obtain some independent feedback on the performance of the bureaucracy.
In column (9’) of Table 7, the FH Press Freedom index is decomposed into its three subcategories: 1)
Legal environment which assesses “both and examination of the laws and regulations that could influ-
ence media content as well as the government’s inclination to use these laws and legal institutions in
order to restrict the media’s ability to operate”; 2) Political environment which measures “the degree
of political control over the content of news media”; 3) Economic environment which is related to
“the economic considerations that can influence the media’s activities” (Freedom House (2010a), pp.
12-13). Only the last two dimensions appear to be significant FDI determinants. Freille, Haque and
Kneller (2007) find a similar outcome when investigating the impact of media freedom on corruption.
Overall, these results suggest that the key factor which explains why democracies attract more FDI
than autocracies is their tendency to exhibit greater media freedom, which presumably restrains bu-
reaucratic corruption and enhances policy transparency. From another perspective, an autocracy can
be as successful as a democracy in terms of attracting FDI as long as these two outcomes are met; the
success of Singapore immediately comes to mind.
The other dimension of public governance, regulatory quality, always exerts a positive and sta-
tistically significant impact on FDI, whatever the estimator used, although its influence appears to be
smaller when outliers are controlled for. Based on column (6’), a one standard deviation improvement
in the quality of regulations would have about twice the short-run positive impact as a one standard
deviation move towards more media freedom (10%). Amin and Djankov (2009) show that democratic
regimes tend to favour pro-business microeconomic reforms. On this basis, it is likely that the direct
impact of democracy on FDI that we have estimated represents a lower bound effect since it does not
account for the positive impact of democracy via better regulatory quality.
For each regression, about 28% of the observations are flagged as outliers by the R-FE estimator.
As can be seen at the bottom of Table 7, many countries are occasionally outliers during the period
1996-2006. Predominant sources of R-FE and M-S outliers for regressions (7’) and (7”) can be
observed in Figure 6.1. This Figure indicates the countries for which the average standardised residual
is outside the non-outlying range delimited by the two horizontal lines. When [only] the median
standardised residual is also outside this range, a square [triangle] is used instead of a circle. The
two estimators tend to identify the same countries as sources of large outliers although divergences
20
occur. For example, the R-FE estimator considers that some observations related to Haiti are large
outliers, whereas this is not the case for the MS estimator. The choice between these two estimators
can be based on the R-squared values, reported at the bottom of Table 7. It can be seen that the
R-FE estimator increases drastically the fit of the empirical model whereas this is not true for the
MS-estimator. Hence, the former estimator seems more suitable to explain the typical response of
FDI to democratic changes.5
The presence of few squares and triangles in the left and right panels of Figure 6 shows that very
few countries are block concentrated outliers (Bramati and Croux, 2007), i.e. for most countries,
the volume of FDI that they received was, most of the time, well predicted by the empirical model
estimated. For regression (7), the block outliers are Djibouti and Lybia. Interestingly, the FDI per-
formance of the so-called BRICS countries,6 which accounted for 48% of the change in total FDI
liabilities during the sample period, does not appear to have been atypical, despite the fact that some
studies have frequently suggested that they are outliers (Choi, 2009). Hence, contrary to some of
the worries raised in the political science literature (Li, 2009), the use of robust regression methods
does not necessarily imply a drastic loss of coverage of the activities of foreign investors. Large FDI
recipients are not necessary outliers, as long as the empirical model is reasonably well specified.
The use of summary statistics in Figure 6.1 is not informative about the FDI trajectory of ‘atypical’
countries and obscures the fact that not all observations related to these countries are outliers. Figure 7
illustrates these two issues by plotting the yearly standardised residuals for four countries previously
flagged as source of outliers. It shows that the empirical model was unable to explain the large
fluctuations in FDI received by countries like Botswana (BWA) or Zambia (ZMB) over the period
1998-2006 or the greater attractiveness of Zambia (ZMB) or Tajikistan (TJK) after the year 2002.
Figure 7 reflects the difficulty for the researcher to model the economic developments of heterogenous
countries with a parsimonious set of control variables; the empirical model may explain well the
average response but necessarily struggle to account for country-specific idiosyncracies.
6.2 Democracy and natural resources
In a recent paper, Asiedu and Lien (2011) argue that democracy promotes FDI only in non-resource
exporting countries. Their rationale, supported by their empirical analysis is that, in resource-exporting
5An additional advantage of our estimator is that it allows easy correction of the standard errors for clustering.
6BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia), India, China, and South Africa).
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Figure 7: FDI attractiveness of four atypical countries
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countries, which tend to attract FDI mainly concentrated in extractive industries, foreign investors pre-
fer the stability and easy access to natural resources that an autocracy presumably offers. This is a
remarkable finding as it goes against the alleged benefits of democracy outlined in the introduction
and because Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin (2011) and Jensen and Johnston (2011) have shown that
autocracies are more likely to expropriate foreign investors, including in the petroleum, natural gas
and mining sectors. Nevertheless, we re-estimate our econometric model, which now includes Asiedu
and Lien (2011)’s proxy for natural resource rich countries, the share of fuel and minerals in total
merchandise exports, and its interaction with our different measures of democracy. Data on exports
come from UNCTAD.7
Table 8 shows that estimates based on the classical FE estimator would, to a certain extent, support
Asiedu and Lien (2011)’s arguments. However, once again, the R-FE estimates tell a different story. In
most regressions, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, large, and statistically significant,
indicating that the higher a country’s natural resource export intensity, the more positive the effect of
democracy on FDI. Figure 8 summarises the relationship between the effect of democracy on FDI and
natural resources abundance; the impact of democracy is presented at different deciles of the share of
fuel and minerals in total merchandise exports. For high levels of natural resources, whichever the
measure of democracy employed, the impact of greater democracy is positive, statistically significant,
and substantially much larger than in resource-poor countries.
The negative association between violent conflicts and democracy may explain why the latter
matters particularly for FDI in extractive industries. Given the high sunk costs that foreign firms
in the mining and oil sectors incur, they are likely to be strongly deterred by violent sociopolitical
instability and other forms of destructive conflicts, e.g. riots and guerilla warfare, which threaten
their assets (Barham, Chavas and Coomes, 1998). Democracy may reduce social and political unrest,
which may also be more likely in resource-exporting countries.
From an exogenous perspective, it can be expected that democracy provides to dissatisfied groups
both the political opportunity to become actively involved into the decision-making progress and
peaceful channels of expression to voice their grievances (Rummel, 1995; Ellingsen, 2000). Hence,
stronger checks and balances, which may not only proxy for policy stability but also for the degree of
political inclusiveness (Reynal-Querol, 2005), and media freedom, may guarantee that discontent is
expressed in non-violent and destructive ways, e.g. protests (Przeworski et al., 2000; Pal, 2011). From
7http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
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Figure 8: FDI in resource exporting countries and democracy
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an endogenous perspective, democratisation may have been the rational choice of the elites that do not
wish to be expropriated when faced with the likelihood of a revolution too costly to repress or to avoid
via redistributive policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Even though democracy and violence are
again negatively correlated, it is the threat of the later which has triggered the emergence of the latter.
Whichever the causality sense, the premium that FDI in extractive industries put on non-violence can
explain their attractiveness for democracy.
6.3 The mediating role of inequality
It is possible that the link between FDI, democracy and natural resources depends on an additional
factor. A prominent candidate from the growth literature is income inequality. In a textbook median
voter model, greater income inequality leads to more demands for redistribution, resulting in more
taxation (Alesina and Perotti, 1994). A government wishing to maximise its chances to be reelected
would tend to avoid taxing domestic producers and therefore prefer to redistribute income via an
increase in the tax burden of foreign investors, or other means of (creeping) expropriation (Caves,
1996; Desbordes and Vauday, 2007). In periods of high commodity prices, such as the 1998-2006
period, foreign firms in extractive industries are ideal targets as governments can easily argue that the
visible windfall profits of those firms, unrelated to the intrinsic merit of their operative capabilities
and generated by the exploitation of territorial resources, ought to be shared in a more balanced
25
way. Furthermore, given the relatively scarcity of natural resources and the extremely high level of
sunk costs required to extract, process and distribute them, capital mobility in these industries is low.
Foreign firms cannot credibly threaten to move their operations abroad in response to an increase
in taxation or the formulation of adverse policies. Hence, while democracy may reduce the risk of
conflict, it may also increase regulatory uncertainty. We investigate this possibility by including in our
model the Gini index of net income inequality and its interactions with democracy, natural resource
export intensity and both. Data on the Gini coefficient come from Solt (2009).
Table 9 and Figure 9 summarise our results.8 The number of outliers remains about the same as in
previous regressions (about 30%), despite our adoption of a more flexible specification. A comparison
of the classical and robust FE estimates shows again that results tend to be very different once the
influence of outliers is controlled for. Focusing on the R-FE estimates, the impact of democracy on
FDI is now less clear-cut than before as it is the product of the proxy used, natural resource export
intensity and income inequality. As hypothesised, when a country’s natural resource export intensity is
high, the positive impact of democracy is weaker when income inequality is high. Foreign investors in
the oil or mining industries presumably discount the benefits of more democracy by the probability of
being confronted, now or once the investment has been ‘sunk’, with higher taxation or more stringent
regulations.
For some measures, when a country’s natural resource export intensity is low, democracy exerts
its strongest positive impact on FDI when income inequality is high. Assuming that FDI in extractive
industries is relatively low, this effect can be interpreted as the belief that democratic progress, in ad-
dition to all the previously mentioned benefits, will favour socio-political stability, while high capital
mobility ought to deter greater taxation of foreign firms.
Remarkably, in high resource exporting/income inequality countries, greater press freedom seems
to deter FDI. That is possibly because more press freedom allows the emergence, persistence and dis-
semination of redistribution demands beyond the election date. In other words, it is possible that me-
dia freedom acts as a commitment device, guaranteeing that politicians hold their electoral promises
(Besley, Burgess and Prat, 2002). Column (8’) of Table 9 and Figure 9 (bottom right) show that this
negative impact of greater media freedom outweighs the positive impact of other democratic attributes
when both natural resources and income inequality are high. The recent expropriations, nationalisa-
tions, forced renegotiations of contracts and higher taxes and royalties that foreign firms operating in
8For clarity’s sake, confidence intervals are not reported in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: FDI in resource exporting countries, democracy and income inequality
extractive industries have endured in relatively democratic countries meeting these two criteria, e.g.
Bolivia, Ecuador or Zambia, provide additional factual support to our hypothesis.
The coefficients on the proxies of democracies, in Tables 8 and 9, correspond to the impact of
democratic changes when a country is characterised by an absence of natural resources and perfectly
equal distribution of income. In this hypothetical case, stronger democracy often appears to deter FDI,
e.g column (1’) in Table 9. As shown in Figure 9, for low values of natural resource abundance, this
is especially the case when the proxy for democracy corresponds to the degree of political constraints
on policy change. This result shows again that the impact of a given democratic attribute on FDI is
context-specific. When the threat of socio-political instability is low and foreign firms do not make
high sunk costs to extract natural resources, multinational enterprises may be reluctant to invest in
countries where the likelihood of reforms becomes smaller due to a rise in veto players.
Before concluding, it is worth investigating whether our results would have been different if we
had estimated our models with an M-S estimator. In the Appendix, Tables 10 and 11 report the M-S
estimates and Figures 10 and 11 summarise the results. In Figure 10, it can be seen that we often fail
to find that the effect of democracy on FDI is a function of natural resources abundance. In Figure
11, democracy tends to exert its highest impact in countries characterised by high income inequality
and high natural resources abundance. These findings are different from those obtained using a R-
FE estimator. We can use the R-squared of the R-FE and M-S regression models to make a choice
between the two sets of ‘robust’ results. The empirical models estimated by R-FE fit much better the
29
data than those estimated by the M-S estimator; the average R-squared is 0.99 with the former and
0.82 (0.87) for Figure 10) with the latter, worse than the R-squared obtained with the standard fixed
effects estimator. On that basis, the results obtained using a R-FE estimators ought to be preferred.
7 Conclusion
The contributions of this paper have been two-fold. First, we developed a new robust-to-outliers
dummy estimator, which ought to be extremely useful to applied economists, given the increasing
preference for panel data fixed effects models in Economics. Second, we used this estimator to inves-
tigate the recent impact of democracy on foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that once outliers
are controlled for, democratic attributes tend to attract FDI, especially when they are associated with
stronger checks and balances, greater inclusiveness, or media freedom. Furthermore, we find that
the positive effects of democracy are even larger when FDI is concentrated in natural resources. A
plausible explanation is that democracy reduces the occurrence of violent conflicts, which are a major
deterrent for FDI in extractive industries characterised by large sunk costs. Finally we put forward
the case that other factors, such as income inequality, also play a mediating role in the relationship
between FDI and democracy. Even though democracy may reduce social and political unrest in highly
unequal societies, it may also trigger damaging redistributive policies for FDI in resource-abundant
countries. Overall, this paper demonstrates that the impact of democracy on FDI is extremely com-
plex an difficult to measure as it depends on the democratic attribute considered, the host country’s
characteristics, and the estimator used.
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Appendix: algorithm for the robust identification of outliers
Intuitively, the LS estimator of θ is θˆLS = (X
′X︸︷︷︸
∑
XX
)−1X ′y︸︷︷︸
∑
Xy
, where
∑
XX and
∑
Xy are respectively n
times the covariance ofX and (X, y). If we replace
∑
XX and
∑
Xy by some robust counterparts, this
estimator will become resistant to outliers. Hence, we propose to use the Stahel-Donoho estimate (see
(Maronna and Yohai, 2000)) to identify and remove multivariate outliers in the set M = (y,X) =
(y,X1, X2) and obtain robust ˆ
∑
XX and
∑ˆ
Xy. Once we have preliminary estimates for parameters θ
and residuals ri, we can use an iterative algorithm to find a solution to (3).
Our algorithm is therefore:
1. Use a multivariate outlier detection tool (more precisely, as suggested by Maronna and Yohai
(2000), the Stahel-Donoho estimate) to measure the “outlyingness” of each individual consid-
ering the data cloud M =(y,X1,X2). This estimator is a multivariate outlier identification tool
based on univariate projections. Outlyingness distances correspond to the largest distance of
each point with respect to a center of the projected data cloud when considering all possible
directions for the projections. The effect of dummies is partialled-out in each projection. This
has the advantage of taking into account the effect of dummies, but without facing the issue of
collinear subsamples.9 Since these distances are distributed for Gaussian data as
√
χ2p
2+1
we
can flag individuals as being outliers when their outlyingness distance is larger than a given
quantile of
√
χ2p
2+1
(generally the 95th or 99th percentile).10
2. Apply a weight zero to all the outliers, and use a standard LS estimator to fit the model robustly
and to estimate “robust” residuals for all observations.
3. Use the robust residuals to start a standard iterative algorithm. Note that dummies are now
treated like the other explanatory variables since no subsampling is needed anymore.
MS estimates
Tables 10 and 11 report the M-S estimates. Figures 10 and 11 summarise the results.
9See Maronna and Yohai (2000) for further details.
10Note that the degrees of freedom is p2 + 1 and not p+ 1 because dummy variables will be partialled-out.
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Figure 10: M-S estimation: FDI, democracy and natural resources
Note: Dashed lines delimit the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 11: M-S estimation: the mediating role of inequality
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